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Reproduce or Perish? The Artefact of the Fertility 
Concept and the French School of Demography 
Sandrine Bertaux  
Abstract: »Sich reproduzieren oder untergehen? Das Artefakt ‚Fertilität’ und 
die ‚Französische Schule’ der Demographie«. This article investigates the 
complicated and intertwined history between the scientific discipline of de-
mography, the depopulation debate and the pronatalist lobby, and French re-
publican policies from the late nineteenth century till the eve of the Second 
World War. I suggest that central to this history is the concept and codification 
of fertility. 
Keywords: France, fertility, immigration, demography, fascism. 
Introduction 
Since the mid-eighties, there has been a radical shift in focus in the global 
demographic discourse: world fertility trends no longer fuel an alleged over-
population problem but one of alleged coming depopulation. According to the 
United Nations World Fertility Report (2010, xi), since the 1970s fertility 
trends have fallen to “unprecedented rates and unprecedented levels”. How-
ever, such shift in focus does not signal a change in paradigm from “overpopu-
lation” to “depopulation;” as Ian Hacking (2002, 18) underscores the “popula-
tion problem” is always posited in relative terms for it “denotes both the 
population explosion of other peoples and too low birth rate of one’s own peo-
ple”. Indeed, the UN World Fertility Report does not so much stress world 
homogenous level of fertility rates than it emphasizes, instead, differentials in 
fertility between “developed,” “developing” and “less developed” areas. The 
“developed world,” the report states, is the avant-garde of declining fertility 
trends and “59 countries or areas had a total fertility below 2.1 children per 
woman, the level required to ensure the replacement of generations in low 
mortality populations” (UN 2010, xi). Echoing the UN Population Division, the 
EU’s statistical agency Eurostat (2008, No page number) declared that it is 
only a matter of years before the aggregated death rate of the 27 member states 
that composed the European Union outnumbers its aggregated birth rate. Since 
“today all European nations have fertility rates below the long-term replace-
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ment rate,” some demographers contend that “many European countries in-
creasingly face the prospect of absolute population decline in the coming years 
or decades” (Bloom and Sousa-Poza 2010, 129-130). 
The prospect of imminent depopulation is not a new discourse to Europe 
(Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). It first emerged in France as a discourse of 
national decadence but by the 1930s, although US scholars and private founda-
tions played a major role in the conversation on declining fertility, the “popula-
tion problem” was viewed as a specific European one. In the late 1920s, a 
novel codification of fertility prophesied the extinction of Western and North-
ern Europeans (Kuczynski 1928) – if not the entirety of the white race (Boverat 
1931) – within a few generations, herein granting further legitimacy to public 
discourse on “race suicide”. Because the history of demography, the depopula-
tion discourse and the endorsement of the concept of fertility are much inter-
twined with French history, I will focus specifically on France. There is how-
ever an additional reason to explore fertility through French history in regard to 
contemporary fertility discourses in the West. While a recent Eurostat report 
(2011) underscores that “in many EU Member States immigration is not only 
increasing the total population but also bringing a much younger population,” 
and credits 70% of population growth in the EU in 2008 to the coming of im-
migrants, some demographers argue for twenty years, even massive immigra-
tion would not suffice to counter the down trend (van de Kaa 1987). Whatever 
changes will occur in fertility trends “negative population momentum has set 
in” (Reher 2007, 191). Because France was the only massive immigration 
country in Europe in the early thirties, with nearly 3 million non-French citi-
zens representing around 7 per cent of the metropole’s population (without 
oversea possessions), a debate connecting fertility rate and immigration was an 
essential ingredient of the depopulation conversation. And even more so, it is 
my claim that, besides the wish to oppose the birth control movement, immi-
gration was the very reason for the creation of a nativist movement whose 
claim to authoritative discourse derived from the reduction in family size. If 
France offers a specific focus, my broader aim in this special issue is to under-
score the racial and gendered ontology of the concept of fertility. 
Demography, the Depopulation Question and the 
Citizenship/Nationality Nexus 
While prevailing historiography in France equates the discipline of demogra-
phy with the pronatalist doctrine, and pronatalist demography with an alleged 
Republican political culture (e.g. Huss 1990; Rosental 2003, 9), neither was 
demography born pronatalist out of fear of depopulation nor did Republican 
elites endorse the nativism of the familialist pronatalist lobby beyond its mere 
rhetoric. Rather, I suggest that the adoption of a nativist pronatalist demo-
graphic doctrine sealed in the creation of the National Alliance for the Growth 
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of French Population (hereafter Alliance) in 1896. If it did buttress Republican 
social policies focused on the question of motherhood, its major proposals 
remained a dead letter, and furthermore, it stood against the republican citizen-
ship assimilationist policy towards foreign immigrants and their children. 
When the French botanist and republican political activist Achille Guillard 
coined the term demography, he did not have in mind the declining birth rate; 
rather, by explicitly taking his inspiration from Auguste Comte’s constitution 
of the scientific discipline of sociology a few years earlier, Guillard (1855) had 
a specific target: his aim was to refute the theoretical view and practical solu-
tions formulated by Thomas Robert Malthus in his Essay on the Principle of 
Population. In his anti-revolutionary pamphlet anonymously published in 1798, 
Malthus (Malthus 1976 [1798]) elaborated the first comprehensive and system-
atic theory of population which, with its subsequent enlarged edition now duly 
signed, made its author influential and the first to hold a chair of Modern His-
tory and Political Economy in England in 1805 (Collini, Winch, Burrow 1983, 
67). Malthus’ “Principle of Population” rested on the fundamental axiom of the 
imbalance between the means of subsistence, or production, he believed to 
follow an arithmetic rate of growth, and population growth, or reproduction, he 
viewed as progressing according to a geometrical rate. Accordingly, this law of 
population shaped his view on poverty: any attempt to relieve poverty, he clai-
med, aggravates the ill it seeks to eliminate by encouraging the poor to marry 
and procreate (Malthus 1976 [1798], 97). In the second enlarged edition, Mal-
thus stated that: 
A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsis-
tence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society do 
not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, 
in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature’s mighty feast there is no 
vacant cover for him. (Malthus 1992 [1803], 249)  
Although Malthus’ infamous passage was removed in subsequent editions, it 
captures Malthus’ fundamental statement that the roots of poverty were not in 
human institutions as the philosophes of the French Revolution contended but 
in biology. The Anglican priest morally condemning the disconnection between 
sexuality and procreation as a vice advocated a “moral restraint” which amoun-
ted to assigning the English popular classes to sexual abstinence in the pre-
marital period or even to life-long abstinence and abandonment of marriage 
(Malthus 1976 [1830], 250).  
With the novel scientific field for the study of the dēmos, Guillard sought to 
debunk such naturalization of poverty. The first occurrence of démographie 
issued from Guillard’s pen in 1854 (Schweber 2006, 44) and he established the 
new scientific field in his book explicitly titled Eléments de statistique humaine 
ou démographie comparée (Elements of Human Statistics or Comparative 
Demography) published in 1855. Whereas according to Libby Schweber (2006,  
44) Guillard assigned demography the task “to replace political economy,” it 
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was in the shadow of anthropology that demography first gained recognition in 
France. Guillard’s disciple and son-in-law, doctor Louis-Adolphe Bertillon, the 
man with whom he had spent some time in jail in the wake of Louis-
Napoleon’s coup, held the chair of Demography and Medical Geography, one 
of the six chairs created within the school of Anthropology of Paris founded in 
1876 under the leadership of Paul Broca (Clark 1973, 118). Bertillon initially 
taught “statistics of races” then “intellectual and moral qualities of social 
groups” (Clark 1973, 118). Bertillon became the head of the bureau of statistics 
of Paris and founded an international journal of demography and organized the 
International Congress of Demography during the 1878 Universal Exhibition in 
Paris (on the development of statistics, see Clark 1973, ch. 5 “The Social Stat-
isticians”, 112-146). 
Admittedly, the defeat of French armies at Sedan before the Prussian armies, 
and the loss of the French Eastern territories of Alsace and part of the Lorraine, 
informed the pronatalist turn in France: indeed, the head of the French bureau 
of Statistics, Alfred Legoyt who, inspired by Malthus’ thesis, lauded the French 
working class for its prudential procreation, lost his position (Cole 2000, 4). 
However, if France’s military defeat opened up a space to pronatalist discourse, 
it was some twenty-five years later, in 1896, when Jacques Bertillon – Louis-
Adolphe Bertillon’s son who had taken over the Bureau of statistics of Paris at 
his death (Clark 1973, 139) – founded the National Alliance for the Growth of 
French Population (Alliance nationale pour l’accroissement de la population 
française) a pronatalist and nativist lobby. 
Joshua Cole (2000) forcefully demonstrated how republican social policies 
focused on motherhood were implemented prior the depopulation debate be-
came widely endorsed, and helped Republicans to pass social policies that 
radically altered the relation between the state and the family enshrined in the 
patriarchal Civil Code of 1804 by undermining paternal authority. According to 
Cole (2000, 150-151), it was a paper written in 1858 by Bertillon on infant 
mortality and wet-nursing which was instrumental in the creation of a chair of 
demography at the School of Anthropology of Paris, with the strategic aim at 
proving the power of statistics to a skeptical audience. Bertillon blamed French 
women’s abdication of “their natural function as mothers,” but his paper was 
only and timely published at his death in 1883 in the Annales de démographie 
internationale legitimizing the Republicans policies on motherhood without 
connecting them to “the troubling issue of women’s labor” that Bertillon had 
failed to mention (Cole 2000, 155). Therefore, when the Alliance was created, 
motherhood was already a republican policy albeit disconnected from the de-
population debate. Created in the midst of the Dreyfus Affair and in the Drey-
fusard camp (Clark 1973, 140), the Alliance was anchored within the republi-
can élite. However, even when the depopulation question pervaded France’s 
fin-de-siècle discourses, the republican elite had only paid lip service to prona-
talist reformist demands. The nomination of an extra-parliamentary commis-
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sion on depopulation in 1902, subsequently enlarged, failed to pass any legisla-
tion, even though the Alliance received the coveted status of Association of 
Public Utility on the eve of the First World War. 
Nevertheless, Bertillon father and son were influential in framing mother-
hood as the “biological destiny” of French women (Cole 2000, 187). Louis-
Adolphe Bertillon appropriated the distinction between “fecundity” and “fertil-
ity” proposed by the Scottish doctor J. Matthews Duncan (Cole 2000, 189-
192). While fecundity is the child-bearing period for women, a concept which 
can be traced back in the seventeenth century, fertility is the effective reproduc-
tion of women. The two terms entered French language in a twisted mode for 
the French bureau of statistics used the term fertility to designate the number of 
birth for 1000 inhabitants which is commonly designated today as birth-rate 
(Cole 2000, 188). The adoption in French of fecundity for what the English 
termed fertility is epitomized by Emile Zola’s novel Fécondité (literally fertil-
ity) – a prominent member of the Alliance – written during his exile in London 
after having launched his famous J’accuse! (1898) in support of Captain Drey-
fus. The measurement of “marital fertility” revealed that French wives had 
fewer children than their counterpart in neighboring countries. If pronatalism 
stood in staunch opposition to the birth control movement, it shared eugenics 
concern about the future quality of the population. Paul Weindling (1989, 243) 
identifies Jacques Bertillon as a precursor of the exploration of fertility differ-
ential across social classes when he conducted a survey on urban “fecundable” 
women and their effective “fertility” in a transnational European comparison at 
the eve of the twentieth century which showed that lower social classes were 
the most prolific, hence providing the biological future of nations. But while 
the evidence of declining fertility became associated solely with women, as 
Karen Offen (1984, 648) pointed, for Jacques Bertillon the depopulation prob-
lem was a “man’s issue…Bertillon argued that the trend could be reversed 
simply by amending tax laws that affected men’s property and patrimony and 
thereby bolstered patriarchal pride”. This gendered construction of a “female” 
evidence and a “male” solution undermined pronatalist claims, and Gaston 
Bouthoul (1922, TBA) mocked the internal contradiction of pronatalist famili-
alism inspired by the Le Play school vaunting the patriarchal model of family 
for, he argued, it had the effect that many men and women never married. Not 
only pronatalism was not getting on well with familialism but the latter ap-
peared to preclude the former. 
In contrast to Terry N. Clark (1968) who considered Jacques Bertillon “as 
one of the most prolific and influential quantitative social scientists,” Libby 
Schweber (1997, 21) contends that he was foremost a “militant” uninterested in 
the pursuit of the “promotion of demography as science or its theorization”. 
This a posteriori exclusion of the militant activities of Jacques Bertillon – that 
is, the creation of the Alliance – appositely upholds demography’s claim to 
science by conveniently redrawing the boundaries of a pure scientific field of 
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demography in opposition to militant propaganda. What Schweber fails to take 
into account, however, is that it was the very understanding that the declining 
trends in “marital fertility” had its roots in the will of legitimate couples which 
grounded the call for pronatalist reforms as much as for a propagandistic or-
ganization. Whereas social inequalities were central to Guillard’s project of a 
science of demography and republican militancy, his grandson Jacques Bertil-
lon called instead for a propagandistic organization to fight against claims for 
equality of women and homegrown birth control movements. Indeed, the im-
mediate concern that triggered the creation of the Alliance was the creation, in 
1896, by Paul Robin of the League for Human Regeneration, a neo-malthusian 
league (Offen 1984, 658-659), which unlike Malthus’ view, campaigned for 
what soon was termed birth control at a time in which both the manufacture 
and sale of contraceptives, and the dissemination of contraceptive information 
were allowed (Watson 1952, 261). As the British demographer David V. Glass 
noted (1940, 150) the immediate post-World War I period witnessed the offi-
cial recognition of the pronatalist propaganda. In 1920, a High Council for 
Natality attached to the Ministry of Health was created and in 1921, a Federa-
tion of Associations of Large Families of France, an umbrella organization 
aiming at organizing nationwide propaganda that held an annual National Con-
gress of Natality. Adolphe Landry who had taken over scientific leadership of 
the Alliance after the death of Jacques Bertillon in 1922 and became its vice-
president, also presided over the parliamentary Group for the Protection of 
Family, while energetic Fernand Boverat, the Alliance’s general secretary, was 
member of the High Council on Natality and became soon its vice-president. A 
special holiday celebrating motherhood was proclaimed (see also Koven and 
Michel 1990). While the question of “natality” was institutionalized, it had a 
legal upshot in the 1920 law which banned the manufacture, sale, advertise-
ment and use of female contraceptives (Watson 1952, 261-262) and in 1923 
punishment concerning abortion, which was already mentioned in the Penal 
Code, was aggravated (Watson 1952, 265). Although the repression of abortion 
was reluctantly enforced by the judiciary, it nevertheless served as a legal in-
strument to repress the French birth control movement. Moreover, this postwar 
development cannot be credited to the huge French loss during the war. Rather, 
the Great War was at the origin of a curious accounting according to which, in 
addition to dead soldiers and civilians, deficit in births or the births that did not 
take place were added. Adolphe Landry (1934, 11) asserted bluntly that France 
had lost 2 million and half inhabitants, “as much caused by dead than by birth it 
prevented”. 
Paul Smith (1996, 214) contends that before the mid-thirties, “the state re-
fused to take on board demographic anxieties,” and similarly, Susan Pedersen 
(1995, 357) situates the emergence of a pronatalist consensus in the thirties in 
what she terms the “parental welfare state”. However, the twenties and early 
thirties were fundamental for the pronatalist movement to invest Republican 
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institutions. Alliance members continued to build in pronatalist familialism 
within political institutions and invest both state institutions and parliamentary 
instances. Notwithstanding the fact that the Conseil National des Femmes 
Françaises (CNFF, National Council of French Women), a secular feminist 
organization created in 1900, joined the patriotic call for the war, there was a 
postwar backlash to feminist organizations (Thébaud and Bard 1999, 149-166). 
As Laura Lee Downs (1995, 168) underscores “as the demand for women’s 
labor continued to rise,” during the First World War, furthermore in occupa-
tions traditionally the preserve of men such as metalwork, the question that 
concerned policymakers about the “home front” was not women’s wage but 
how to protect “women’s maternal capacity” in war industries. The French 
pronatalist state sought, with the introduction in factories of nursing rooms, to 
conciliate labour and motherhood and also to discipline and control practices of 
breastfeeding and hygiene, impacting women’s practices (Downs 1995, 169-
170). During the war, the CNFF collaborated with Albert Thomas, the State 
Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Armament and Munitions, to set up in 1916 
a Section d’Etudes Féminines (SEF) at the Musée Social from which organiza-
tion Albert Thomas drew ten members to compose the same year his Comité du 
Travail Féminin under the auspices of his Ministry which would find employ-
ment in war factories for women displaced from the war zone. But after the war 
the SEF was closed down by the Musée Social’s president Georges Risler, a 
prominent figure of the pronatalist movement, on the ground that it was too 
political (Smith 1996, 15). 
To advance its cause, the Alliance revived the old idea of the family vote, a 
family-based form of plural suffrage, and in 1919, in a public rally attended by 
both Jacques Bertillon and Adolphe Landry signaled the start of their campaign 
(Bertaux 2001, 46-48). As the Alliance considered the monogamous heterosex-
ual family the primary social unit and legitimate norm, they claimed that it also 
ought to be the unit for political representation. However, this was against the 
background of demand for political citizenship by feminist organizations. Un-
like other conceptions of the family vote, the Alliance argued that it would help 
implement pronatalist politics of population, and included in the family vote 
women’s suffrage under specific conditions. Thus, the family vote in the hands 
of the Alliance after the Great War became a weapon to oppose the granting of 
political rights to French women as individuals while it was framed as progres-
sive. Herein, they promoted the incorporation of women into political rights 
conditioned by their civil and reproductive status. 
The authority of their argument was derived from statistics. The imbalance 
between the sexes aggravated by the Great War was invoked to bar women 
from individual access to political rights. They calculated that the family vote 
would give suffrage to 25,700,000 men and 13,500,000 women, or two-third 
for men and one-third for women (cited in Bertaux 2001, 47). It was on this 
“statistical” ground that they rejected political rights to French women even if 
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granted at age 30, for it would leave French men “only a small majority” (cited 
in Bertaux 2001, 47). It was deputy Henri Roulleaux-Dugage who brought 
before the parliament, in 1916 and in 1920, the proposal of the family vote. 
Although the proposal considered female suffrage, strikingly, the mother would 
vote for her children only if the husband was dead – that is, as widow – but if 
he were alive, he would vote for his children. However, while in the 1916 
proposal the married wife had no suffrage, in 1920 the proposal stated that she 
could vote for herself (Smith 1996: TBA). The family vote seemed such an 
influential proposal that one US scholar commented in 1926 that “its adoption 
in a reasonably near future is by no means unlikely” (Gooch 1926, 300). This 
proposal survived the political rights granted to women in 1944 when in the 
publication in 1945 of the High Consultative Committee of Population and 
Family revealed that the family vote was still seriously considered for all elec-
tions at universal suffrage (Bertaux 2001, 48). And it is still entertained by 
some demographers to “solve” the depopulation problem (e.g. Demeny 1986, 
354).  
Pronatalism has been interpreted as a response to French cultural anxiety in 
the face of its declining power and prestige in Europe, hence shaping a specific 
French republican political culture. However, its most fervent supporter Jac-
ques Bertillon opposed the republican deliberate policy of assimilation into 
French citizenry of second and third-generation immigrants enshrined in the 
1889 Nationality Code, or what Rogers Brubaker (1992) identified as the very 
core of republican French self-understanding of nationhood. The nationalist 
and xenophobic tone in Bertillon’s work and the Alliance put the pronatalist 
movement at odds with Republican policies. Gérard Noiriel (1988, 35) under-
scored how the very term immigration emerged with the novel field of demog-
raphy in the late nineteenth century. In 1851, a novel category of “foreigner” 
was introduced in the French census classification and a double jus soli provi-
sion in French Nationality law which provided that children born in France of a 
foreign father born in France would have French nationality at birth, albeit with 
the possibility to reject it at majority age. In 1889, the Nationality Code modi-
fied the double jus soli (article 23) by nullifying the possibility to reject French 
citizenship at majority age and added a simple jus soli provision (article 44) 
granting French nationality to children born in France of foreign citizens at 
their majority age (Brubaker 1992, 210). The law also aimed at facilitating 
naturalizations. As structural demand for foreign labour drew an increasing 
number of foreigners and turned France into a country of massive immigration, 
the law was crucial to turn second and third-generation immigrants into French 
citizens in the French metropole as well as to sustain French colonization in 
Algeria where half of the settlers were foreign citizens, and the indigenous 
subjects French nationals, albeit excluded from French citizenship rights (on 
Algeria see Shepard 2006). 
 128 
While Bertillon (1897; 1911) lamented France’s loss of power, he neverthe-
less rejected the deliberate assimilationist policy underlying the 1889 National-
ity Code. Foreigners, Jacques Bertillon contended, were endangering France by 
creating foreign colonies on the French territory susceptible of irredentist 
claims when located at French borders, and the Nationality Code, far from 
solving this question, created instead “artificial French” that is, citizens who 
may not be “culturally French” (francisés). Instead, Bertillon (1911) advocated 
membership in the French nationality only for those “who ask for” and “de-
serve it”. Immigration, he argued, could never replace a strong pro-natalist 
policy, which alone would be able to ensure “the future of a nationality” (Ber-
tillon 1911). By nationality, he did not mean the codified and institutionalized 
membership in a state, but referred to an alleged plurigenerational French na-
tional identity. In 1916, the Alliance warned, once again, about the “pacific 
invasion” of foreigners, which they believe was more dangerous than military 
invasion (cited in Bertaux 1997). However, in the 1920s, as Elisa Camiscioli 
(2001) underscored, the Alliance radically shifted position on immigration by 
promoting the naturalization of immigrant families. 
For French women, nationality did not equate to citizenship rights but even 
more, it was also productive of foreignness as the French woman who married 
a foreigner had to follow the patriarchal rule enshrined in European civil codes 
– that is, it entailed the loss of her French nationality even if she still resided in 
France. The civil incapacity of the French married woman was high on the 
agenda of feminist organizations, and nationality was an important item in a 
country which had close to 3 million non-national residents in 1931. Because 
the Alliance had rallied the republican camp, in 1927 reform of the Nationality 
Law granted French women married to foreign men the right to keep their 
French nationality (Camiscioli 2004) and was considered an important victory 
for feminist organizations. In 1932, when Adolphe Landry passed the law 
which made family allowances mandatory and extended it over several work 
sectors in France (albeit dysfunctional in practice), foreigners were included in 
the schemes as workers (Glass 1940, 120). 
In the thirties, France became the first immigration country in the West not 
only because of a structural demand for a foreign and colonial cheap labor 
force, but because the outlets in the United States – and more generally on the 
American continent – were closed and justified on eugenics grounds. It was 
Georges Mauco who, after defending his doctorate on the question of foreign-
ers in the French economy in 1932 under the supervision of geographer Albert 
Demangeon, became France’s major expert and was instrumental in reposition-
ing the issue of settlement and that of labour in racial terms (Bertaux 2000). 
Rallying the prevailing pronatalist discourse, Mauco (1932) argued that if only 
a strong pronatalist policy would help raise the French birthrate, what was 
needed in the meantime in the face of massive immigration was a policy of 
immigration based on ethnic selection. The strength of Mauco’s argument was 
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to reconcile the demographic and economic arguments which appeared then to 
be in opposition. Drawing from surveys in car factories, Mauco argued that 
those racial groups which were considered by employers as the worst workers 
were also those who could not be assimilated in France. He defined assimila-
tion not as a social process but as a racial given: only the immigrant racial 
groups already represented in the French harmonious multi-ethnic mosaic 
could be assimilated. Furthermore, Mauco added that if France needed workers 
in industries, mines and agriculture, it needed not an urban immigrant class of 
shop owners and artisans in competition with the French urban middle class. 
These two lines of reasoning provided which groups were to be barred: the 
Armenians, the colonial workforce, and the Jews (Bertaux 2000). By the same 
token, it indicated that if Jews were no part of the French harmonious racial 
complex, and by singling out the Armenians as bad workers in French indus-
tries, and “Levantines” as undesirable shop owners, Mauco in fact called for 
stopping the arrival of refugees. Yet his call for ethnic selection remained a 
dead letter but as the economic crisis hit France, deportation of immigrants 
accelerated, and restrictions in their residence and citizenship status were pas-
sed (Lewis 2007). When Susan Pedersen (1995, 358) contends that the thirties 
were the foundational moment of a French welfare state of redistributive justice 
centered on children, she overlooks the fact that the provisions in the 1939 
Family Code excluded non-French families (Glass 1940, 110). 
Fertility and the Transnational Politics of Depopulation 
French feminist organizations did not oppose Republican motherhood policy 
and although birth control activists continued their propagandistic work the 
failure of the birth control movement in interwar France, where family plan-
ning was widely practiced without modern birth control devices, could not be 
attributed to the sole repression and a fortiori alleged pronatalist political cul-
ture. Rather, as Cicely Watson (1952, 263) remarked, it was because “the birth 
control movement has failed to integrate its propaganda into the general devel-
opment of family and welfare legislation”. Karen Offen’s contention (1984, 
674-675) that the widespread endorsement of pronatalist concerns by French 
feminist organizations help to improve their conditions disregards how it 
placed the working class women between forced abortion, forced abstinence 
and unintended that is, forced motherhood. Furthermore, as Paul Smith (1996, 
TBA) underscores, feminists came from the same social elites than the prona-
talists. Indeed, it was Adolphe Landry’s sister who took over the CNFF in 1932 
when her brother was advocating the family vote.  
Such anti-feminist and sexist politics were upheld, and legitimized, in the 
transnational politics of depopulation. In 1927, Margaret Sanger, the US leader 
of birth control – a term she coined organized a World Conference on Popula-
tion in Geneva with the hope of putting on the League of Nations’ agenda the 
 130 
question of overpopulation she actively supported on eugenics grounds (Sanger 
1927; Sanger 1938). Although the Conference was a success in gathering scien-
tists from different European countries and the United States, she was excluded 
on the grounds that birth control was regarded as matter of ideology, not of 
science by the male participants. The conference was crucial to legitimate the 
idea of a European depopulation problem. Not only did the Alliance members 
actively present at the Conference take credit for blocking any arrangement 
with the League of Nations, they were also influential enough to host the crea-
tion of the first-ever international professional organization for the study of the 
population problem, the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of 
Population Problems (IUSIPP) in 1928 in Paris at the Musée Social, the same 
institution that had closed down its “feminine” section few years earlier (see 
the status of the IUSIPP, IUSIPP 1932). The IUSIPP triggered the creation of 
national committees. The French Committee chaired by Léon Bernard, a eu-
genicist and the president of the Higher Council on Public Hygiene, included 
among its members many of the prominent Republican figures, both those 
advocating strict pronatalist policies as well as the “hygienists” concerned with 
the quality of the French population (on French eugenics see Schneider 1990). 
The French were also massively present at the International Congress on 
Population held in Rome in 1931 under the leadership of Corrado Gini, the 
head of the Italian Bureau of Statistics, renowned statistician and promoter of 
politics of population as “the scientific basis of fascism” (Gini 1927), and un-
der the honorary presidency of Benito Mussolini, and this in spite of the fact 
that the congress was no longer the official IUSIPP congress (Bertaux 1999, 
588). Indeed, the IUSIPP congress was relocated to London after Gini quar-
reled with US biologist Raymond Pearl who was IUSIPP’s president since its 
creation. The Rome congress was not only a success in gathering scientists and 
militants on the “population problem” at which mentioning birth control was 
officially banned, and even Gini’s mentioning of the name of Malthus pro-
voked Mussolini’s censorship; it was a success for the novel fascist regime as 
well. After the congress, the Alliance’s journal lauded Mussolini’s “pronatal-
ist” politics of population, and remained silent on its repressive, coercive and 
racial aspect in the colonies and the Italian peninsula against Italy’s national 
minorities. And while Mussolini had initially heavily drawn from French pro-
natalist rhetoric, it was now the French pronatalists who borrowed from Musso-
lini’s rhetoric: The journal of the Alliance adopted Mussolini’s slogan 
“Strength in numbers”. 
The transnational politics of depopulation was sealed by the novel codifica-
tion of fertility in the late 1920s attached to the names of Alfred J. Lotka (co-
authored with L. I. Dublin 1925) and Robert R. Kuczynski (1928). They shared 
the same contention according to which the fertility of a population cannot be 
derived from the difference between the birth and the death rates, and that 
fertility is best calculated solely on women and by excluding migration move-
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ments; but they differed in how to reach the “intrinsic natural rate of increase” 
for Lotka, or the “net reproduction rate” for Kuczynski. These scholars estab-
lished the novel concept of “natural reproduction” and what is known today as 
the “one-sex model” in demography. In 1925, Lotka with Louis I. Dublin, his 
colleague at the New York-based Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, pub-
lished what is known today as a foundational article to demography. While 
Lotka had already published on demography, what made their article so rele-
vant is the fact that from a mathematical model this could well become a real-
ity. Indeed, the two authors contended that since the United States had closed 
its door to immigration, the question of the “natural increase” arises as a crucial 
one. But unlike what Dennis Hodgson contended (2001: 3494), Dublin and 
Lotka did not reveal that ”the average American woman in 1920 was having 
only half a child more than was needed to maintain a stationary population” but 
their article explicitly dealt only with “white women”. Thus, what constitutes a 
population was also left to the choice of demographers, and needed not follow 
nationality where racial categories were available.  
David Glass (1940, 149) noted that “although concentrating on the prospects 
and dangers of a declining population, [the Alliance] has also given consider-
able attention to demographic research”. For instance, it was the Alliance that 
commissioned Alfred Sauvy, in 1932, to produce the first-ever published 
French population forecast, and Fernand Boverat’s numerous propagandistic 
brochures helped the popularization of population projections and age pyra-
mids as both a scientific and popular representation of the French population. 
In 1934, Adolphe Landry published La révolution démographique. Etudes et 
essais sur les problèmes de la population (The Demographic Revolution. Stud-
ies and Essays on the Problems of Population) that gave the French school its 
“classic” (Landry 1982 [1934]). Landry provided the suitable theory that would 
help unlock French pro-natalism and strengthen its pretence to science. Like his 
disciple, state statistician Alfred Sauvy, Landry is labeled a “demographer” 
today but both considered themselves political economists. Landry defended 
his doctorate thesis in 1901 on “The social utility of individual property” in 
which, much against the liberal credo, he asserted that individual property may 
not lead to the general wealth but even contribute to its diminishment, while 
furthermore having a decreasing effect on the population (Girard 1982, 4). 
Besides being the leader of the parliamentarian arena of pronatalist lobbying, 
he held a chair of the history of economic thought at the Ecole Pratique des 
Hautes Etudes, and in 1936, became president of the Societe Statistique de 
Paris, which hosted a discussion of demographic methods and theories in 
France. The novelty of Landry’s argument was to stress fertility decline as a 
new social norm, or a new stage in civilization, one disconnected from the 
question of production that has been central to various authors, both before and 
after Malthus. In the new demographic regime, the population was no longer 
regulated by late marriage and high celibacy in order to delay birth – Malthus’ 
 132 
preventive checks – nor by an “abnormal” death rate due to war or epidemics 
but by the fact that sexual intercourse was no longer geared towards procrea-
tion. The “demographic revolution” was that married couples, or marital fertil-
ity, were subjugated to “the rationalization of life”. Landry’s demographic 
model is thus fundamentally the passage from a “natural” or “physiologic” 
fertility of women to one driven by “psychology”. Disconnected from the ques-
tion of production or subsistence, the question was nevertheless one of political 
economy: the rise in “welfare” for all social classes, he argued, impacts re-
gimes of consumption and creates new needs. Progress brings by technologies, 
production and hygiene is just apparent: it creates a materialist civilization. 
Landry acknowledged the universality of the phenomenon yet stressed that 
European populations were in a stage of virtual depopulation that preceded its 
effective depopulation. Sooner or later all populations would undergo the same 
process, but in the meantime, the European civilization was ageing, and would 
disappear first. The ageing of the French population was theorized by Sauvy, 
who argued that it had not only economic and financial consequences but psy-
chological ones as well. Landry’s Demographic Revolution lies in its twofold 
meaning: according to Landry, the French revolution, or democracy, had 
brought new individualistic attitudes that had led to the decline of the birth rate, 
so that a new revolution was needed in order to counteract this civilization 
without progress. In 1936, the Alliance, taking account of the novel universalis-
tic discourse and the excess of death rates over birth rates, changed its name to 
the Alliance for the Struggle against Depopulation.  
Lotka’s model of stable population and Kuczynski’s net reproduction rate 
were introduced in France by Raoul Husson a state statistician in 1931 (see 
Véron 2009). Landry (1982 [1934], 5) argued that the “ancient France” had a 
natality of the type of stable population that is, defined by constant biological 
conditions, and he (1982 [1934], 216) presented the new codification of fertil-
ity by Lotka and Kuczynski. Husson criticized Sauvy’s population projections 
for not relying on Lotka’s model, pointing that Lotka’s model, as Jacques Vé-
ron (2009, 323) notes “could also incorporate net immigration rates by age that 
do not vary with time (but do vary with age), thereby extending the survival 
law to a ‘law of presence in the country at each age’”. But it was this path 
which was not taken. Instead, Sauvy who had already calculated in 1927 the 
demographic input by immigrants would, like his colleagues, considered immi-
grants and their descendants as a separate population. With the eugenic concept 
of assimilation introduced by Mauco, it provided the basis to the racialization 
of the French population which excluded specific groups that were rejected as 
of non-French descent and not one that could account them as fully part of the 
French population. Thus a politics of ethnic selection of immigration would 
have the task to maintain Frenchness and further biological homogenization 
(Bertaux 2000). 
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The French School of Demography,  
Nazism and “Race suicide” 
Hitler followed in the footstep of his role model, Mussolini, by turning the 
“population problem” as the major issue the novel National Socialist regime 
would resolve. Nazi Germany became the Alliance’s focus point of foreign 
experiment in population politics, all the more so once the regime claimed to be 
successful in raising the German birth rate. However, far from viewing Nazi 
Germany as a threat, as some scholars suggest (e.g. Rosental, 9), the Alliance 
members described Nazi politics of population as a model to be imported into 
France. Although, as Gisela Bock (1983) underscored in her seminal article 
how Hitler’s politics of population explicitly mixed pronatalist, anti-natalist, 
eugenic, racist and anti-Semitic provisions depending on the category of 
“population” it constructed and targeted, French demographers reduced it to a 
“pronatalist” policy (Bertaux 2005, 119).  
By misrepresenting Nazi politics of population as “pronatalist,” the French 
pronatalist lobby turned what was incipiently politics based on the intricacy of 
sexism and racism in a context of violent repression into an acceptable model 
for France. In his Demographic Revolution, Landry ([1934] 1982, 93) noted 
that Germany had engaged in “familialist and pronatalist politics,” likely to be 
a “vigorous” program, adding that this policy not only had legal foundations 
but also included “a direct psychological action”. The pronatalist lobby also 
lent official support to the Nazi regime when, in 1935, the IUSIPP International 
Population Congress was held in Berlin and marked, as Stefan Kühl (2001, 
TBA) underscored, the “apex of Nazi propaganda”. The French were not only 
represented as individual scientists, and IUSIPP’s member committee, but went 
as a governmental delegation (Bertaux 2005, 117). Adolphe Landry and Fer-
nand Boverat represented the Ministry of Public Health and Henri Laugier, the 
Ministry of National Education. The Reich Minister Wilhelm Frick, in his 
opening address, endorsing the “white race suicide” rhetoric, underscored the 
centrality of marriage, family and class collaboration to Nazi politics of popula-
tion while he insisted upon the necessity of not letting the empty space left by 
depopulation to the coming of “different races” (Cited in Bertaux 2005, 117-
118). Fernand Boverat wrote in the Alliance’s journal that:  
I am aware that Hitler and Mussolini’s demographic policy is part of their ge-
neral politics, which is imperialist and expansionist (...) Yet the impartial sci-
entist does not care about Hitler and Mussolini’s intentions: he only notes that 
they say the truth in denouncing the white race suicide, 
and commenting on the 1935 Berlin congress wrote: “one of the words that 
many attendees were likely to have in mind was never pronounced: it is that of 
‘Jew’” (cited in Bertaux 2005, 118-119).  
In 1937, Paris hosted IUSIPP congress, and Adolphe Landry and Georges 
Mauco became respectively the IUSIPP president and general secretary. The 
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Germans were well represented in the “international committee” of the con-
gress testifying of their good relation after the 1935 Berlin congress established 
by the French delegation, and no direct confrontation was to be engaged with 
Nazi politics. US anthropologist Franz Boas, who scientifically engaged 
against Aryan ideology, although he gave a paper saw his initial paper proposal 
rejected (Barkan 1996, 325-328). The penetration of Nazi ideology in French 
demography is at the heart of Landry’s civilization thesis. What is hailed as a 
“French classic” was in fact much inspired by the arguments developed by 
German statistician and demographer Friedrich Burgdörfer in his influential 
book A People without Youth [Volk ohne Jugend] first published in 1932 (Vi-
enne 2000). Burgdörfer argued that the cause of declining fertility was the 
“rationalization of sexuality” and underscored the “aging of the German peo-
ple” (Aly and Roth 2004, 26). Although the idea of a rationalization of sexual-
ity was not Burgdörfer’s invention but was first introduced by Julius Wolf in 
his book The Decline of the Birth Rate-The Rationalization of Sexual Life in 
Our Time published in 1912 (Weingart 1987), with the Nazis in power it had 
assumed a new dimension: the rationalization of life had to be the preserve of 
the state. Burgdörfer, who was part of the Expert Committee on Questions of 
Population and Racial Policy set up by the new Nazi government and gathering 
“the elite of Nazi racial theory” (Proctor 1988, 95), as director of the Office of 
Population Statistics, organized the 1933 census at the order of the new Nazi 
government he had welcomed, and as Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth (2004) 
have stressed, the census was no longer to provide information on future popu-
lation trends but “had become a vehicle for calculating the expected numbers of 
births by ‘biologically valuable’ women in the years to come” (Aly and Roth 
2004, 17). Thus Burgdörfer’s cultural thesis served to adopt “a biological per-
spective” (Aly and Roth 1991, 17), to such an extent that he revised his thesis 
to now credit Jews of being the avant-garde of such “rationalization of sexual-
ity” (Vienne 2000).  
The penetration of Nazi ideology is striking in the short section titled “Vital-
ity or the Power of Growth of a People,” Alfred Sauvy wrote in 1936 for the 
Encyclopédie française. Sauvy warned that, “except violent reaction to ageing 
and decline,” “German” and “German-Latin peoples” will enter an ineluctable 
process of decadence, one that “central Europe” seemed “to follow the same 
process of decadence with some delay” but that “yellow peoples” were not 
experiencing.“ He concluded on Russia that would be decisive for the “demo-
graphic and political future of Europe”. Framed as a racial struggle, Sauvy had 
incorporated the French into the “German-Latin” while he clearly pointed to a 
combined demographic and political threat from communist Russia rather than 
Nazi Germany. 
The creation of a High Committee on Population and the passing of the Fa-
mily Code in 1939 must be reappraised not as the achievement of a French 
republican pronatalist consensus since the Second Empire but as an attempt of 
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the fascination of the French politics of population. The Family Code included 
the doubling of legal penalties for abortion, and taxation of bachelors and 
childless couples; a cash bonus to married couples for each child born within 
the two years after the wedding, and state loans for agricultural equipment and 
livestock to French farmers on a ten-year basis, progressively cancelled with 
each child born, and provisions concerning inheritance of farm property that 
favored those with children against the childless owners (Watson 1952). As 
Glass (1940) noted, family allowances were now subjected to pronatalist goals, 
and there was perhaps no better evidence that the concern was no longer one 
that would fall under the category of social policy than the fact that foreigners, 
who in the previous expansion scheme of family allowances in 1932 were 
included as workers were now excluded as foreigners.  
Conclusion: The Politics of Reproduction 
In the thirties, the French school of demography appraised women only through 
the gap between “fecundity” and “fertility” and reduced them to a biological 
fertility index while challenging their position as wage earners and citizens. 
While in Britain and Sweden, population experts endorsed the same codifica-
tion of fertility and also warned of an imminent depopulation (see for instance 
Charles 1934; Myrdal 1941), the depopulation debate was never cut off from 
the “woman question,” or questions of standard of living. Alarming discourses 
about the imminent disappearance of Northern and West Europeans underlie by 
the novel codification of fertility did not lead neither to the same theories nor to 
the same politics of population. 
Instead of raising concerns on questions of fertility, I suggest that we may 
raise concerns about the fertility of the question. The construction of “natural 
reproduction” posits immigration as an unnatural input in population growth. 
Immigrants are thus scrutinized through the biological lenses fostered by the 
fertility concept. But it does so, not only on incoming migrants but by consider-
ing them as a population different from that of the “natural population”. Demo-
graphic categories such as “French of French stock,” “immigrants” and “chil-
dren of immigrants,” the two latter being official categories in the census since 
the 1990s, reinforce such fiction of two populations on the same territory, one 
of “immigrant” descent, and the other of “autochthony” (Bertaux 1997a; Ber-
taux 2011). In other words, fertility talk was concomitant of new instruments of 
calculus predicated on the concept of closed populations, excluding migration 
movements, and calculated on the reproduction of women alone. Thus fertility 
talk rests upon a “one-sex model” anchored in the “natural reproduction” of 
populations in which migrations are constructed as culturally and biologically 
different. Only this new codification could help project populations into the 
future the way the UN Population Division is displaying such material today, 
drawing from the scientific authority of the truth and objectivity that character-
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izes the trust and use of numbers. From a mathematical model, it is given as a 
social representation of reality. Fertility is really not a good starting point from 
which to investigate the political economy of reproduction. 
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